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Preface 
The Terms of Reference (TOR) state that the aim of the study is:  
…to inform DFID of the complementarities and contradictions between PRSP 
processes and existing National Development Strategies. It assesses whether 
the introduction of PRSP is enhancing the poverty reduction processes and 
whether over the medium term the process of preparing, implementing, 
resourcing, and monitoring a PRSP is likely to lead to stronger, more pro-poor, 
more accountable national planning processes.  
 
As a result of dialogue with DFID, the overall objective of this study was 
broadened, to inform DFID about poverty reduction strategies in Asia with the purpose 
of making recommendations for DFID practice in the case study countries, and, when 
relevant, for practice in other Asian countries and other regions.  In its coverage of 
India, Nepal and Vietnam, the study concentrates more on strategic and institutional 
issues than on the political background for poverty reduction planning.  Also, it does 
not analyse the instruments by which development assistance is delivered. Other 
studies commissioned by DFID treat these issues. 
  
 It must be kept in mind that this is a report on the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
process in two countries, Nepal and Vietnam, and on the poverty strategy of India, 
whose government chose not to fully participate in the PRSP process.  Three case 
studies do not provide a basis for drawing general conclusions.  Also, and central to 
understanding this report, it must be recognised that the PRS process is in its early 
stages.  While many governments have initiated PRS programmes, few have reached 
the implementation stage, so this is very much work in progress.  For this reason, 
emphasis is placed on the dynamics and potential of the process, rather than static 
outcomes.  The current report observes the ‘first round’ of PRSs in what is an 
unfolding process.  Lessons from these observations should be interpreted as 
guidelines for the future rather than definitive commentary on the past. 
  
 We shall use the term Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) to refer to the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the process of the development and subsequent use 
in policy of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); in other words, PRS refers 
to process by which this specific policy framework unfolds.  This is to be distinguished 
from the document that emerges during the process, to which we always refer as the 
PRSP.  For emphasis, we shall frequently use the somewhat redundant term, ‘PRS 
process’, as synonymous with PRS. 
 
 Of particular interest to DFID are the conclusions of the study for its work in 
Asia.  In the executive summary these are placed first, and in the text at the end, for 
they follow logically from the preceding analysis and presentation of findings. 
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Executive Summary 
 The recommendations for DFID practice derive from the characteristics of 
Asian countries that we discuss in some detail:  lack of aid dependency (Nepal is an 
exception), long-established planning institutions, and strong government ownership 
of development policy (again, Nepal is an exception).  Derivative from these 
characteristics come the following recommendations.  These refer to practice in Asia,  
and would not typically apply to DFID operations in other regions, especially in the 
sub-Sahara. 
 
1. DFID’s influence on national policy in Asia is more likely to come through 
patient support for institutional change over a long period than via direct 
policy advice at the highest levels of government. 
2. There are levers for change at the sectoral and provincial/state levels which 
can be successfully used.  Entry points would be: 
a. working with line ministries to impact on sectoral plans, such as 
supporting the formulation of an education policy in Vietnam; 
b. collaboration at the state level in India in the development of PRSs, 
and with provincial administrations in Vietnam;  states and provinces 
should be carefully selected for their demonstrated pro-poor 
commitment, and should lead to long-lasting partnerships. 
  
 The assistance modalities for sectoral and provincial/state would include: 
 
1. capacity building with a direct pro-poor outcome, for design of PRSs, 
MTEFs, improvement in implementation, and poverty impact monitoring; 
and 
2. information dissemination, to bring international ‘best practice’ to the 
attention of ministries and provincial/state officials. 
 Following these general principles should position DFID to engage in a 
long term process for institutional change, including more effective budgeting, 
improved implementation, and more effective monitoring. 
 The government of Nepal has demonstrated extremely limited commitment 
to poverty reduction, as evidenced by a general failure of project and programme 
implementation and the on-going civil war. The PRS does not provide a solution to 
these issues. Serious consideration should be given to scaling down DFID 
involvement in Nepal.  Justifiable interventions would be limited to ones that have 
a clear and direct impact on poverty reduction and to conflict related issues. 
 
The Dynamics of the PRSP Process 
 
 The PRS is a partnership-based approach to reducing poverty in low-income 
countries that seeks to empower country stakeholders through national ownership.  
Nationally owned poverty reduction strategies involve an explicit rejection of the 
previous ‘donorship’ approach.  When successful, the PRS process promotes strategies 
that are country driven, comprehensive, that set clear priorities, are partnership based, 
and framed within a long-term perspective.  The PRS process has the potential to 
change the relationship between government and donors & lenders, and between 
governments and civil society.  It has a dynamic that is particular to each country, 
determined by the existing political institutions and the strength of civil society. 
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 Emphasis should on the process by which the PRS document is produced, and 
the ongoing planning, implementation and monitoring that flows from it.  In this 
process, the engagement of civil society creates its own dynamic, which is influenced 
but not controlled by governments and international agencies.  The dynamics within 
governments are altered as a result of the participation by civil society.   
 
 Our assessment criterion for the PRS begins with the following necessary 
condition: 
A PRS contributes positively to the formulation of a national policy strategy 
for poverty reduction if it results in a more poverty focussed policy framework 
than would have been the case in its absence. 
 
 If this criterion is met, the analysis moves on to the following questions: 
1. Was the process nationally owned and country driven, which are essential 
to commitment to implementation?   
2. Is the PRS integrated into the strategic planning framework, including links 
to fiscal instruments?    And 
3. Is the PRS consistent with and does it improve national capacity to 
implement programmes and monitor outcomes?   
 
 In addition to the above, we consider the contribution of the PRS process to 
the understanding of poverty in each country, and the extent to which the process was 
consultative, participatory, and raised public awareness of poverty issues. 
 
Main Findings 
 
 With few exceptions, Asian countries are not aid dependent, and donors & 
lenders have limited influence on government policies.  Therefore, in most Asian 
countries, donors would need to look at the dialogue with governments in a different 
way. Attempts by external agencies to influence policy based on their priorities could 
be and have been counter productive, by provoking a strong nationalist reaction.  It is 
more productive to speak of external agencies ‘contributing to’ or ‘having an impact 
on’ the policy process through indirect means such as capacity building, technical 
advice, knowledge sharing and innovative programmes and projects. 
 
 Another characteristic of many Asian countries is a tradition of 
institutionalised medium and long term planning through agencies created explicitly 
for this purpose.  These exist in all three of the case study countries.  As a result, there 
is both considerable expertise (less so in Nepal), and considerable institutional vested 
interest in the design, implementation and monitoring of policy. 
 
Development Partnerships 
 
1. The most important contribution of the PRS process to development 
partnerships has been its tendency to foster government ownership of 
development policy. 
2. In cases when governments have national poverty strategies in place before 
the PRS process, government ownership is strengthened when donors & 
lenders accept these as the basis for the PRSP document, adapted as necessary. 
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 The PRS process has generated a policy dialogue between development 
agencies and governments that is more partnership-based and consultative.  National 
ownership does not require DFID or other agencies to suspend all judgements;  it 
implies that those judgements arise out of an interactive process with national 
stakeholders.   This approach to partnership admits the possibility that national policy 
makers and representatives of civil society have knowledge of the country that can 
complement and in some circumstances supersede that of external agencies. 
 
 Failures of implementation raise important issues for donors & lenders.  It is 
consistent with national ownership that funding agencies would wish to see their funds 
used effectively.  In the context of effective use of funds the terms ‘political will’ and 
‘political commitment’ can be considered.  In the absence of specifying the political 
context, the term ‘political will’ has limited meaning.  The problem may not be a lack 
of will by the government, but lack of effective power.  Further, political will is not 
static; it is determined by the political and social context.  With few exceptions, it is 
invalid to ascribe the presence or absence of political will to governments in general;  
partly because governments are not monolithic structures, and partly because the 
political and social context is dynamic. 
 
 The term ‘commitment’ is essential to the analysis of effective use of 
development assistance.  Like political will, it is dynamic rather than static.  
Commitment to a project or programme implies that the stakeholder will devote 
resources to it.  Since resources are scarce, it is rational for stakeholders to ration 
commitment.  If DFID anticipates a problem of stakeholder commitment, this can be 
managed, by identifying the constraints to increasing commitment.  If these are 
concrete resource constraints, then it may be possible to address them within the 
country assistance programme, for example, through capacity building. 
 
 We judge that the national governments of India and Vietnam have shown 
political will for and commitment to the design and implementation of poverty 
reduction programmes.  Judgements about commitment at the state and provincial 
levels are more difficult to make, especially in India where political circumstances 
vary across states, from a high degree of commitment to little if any.  In Vietnam, 
problems of administrative capacity and analytical skills have a strong impact on the 
ability to design and implement programmes.  It follows that while there is 
considerable scope for work below the national level, selectivity by DFID is necessary 
to have successful programmes at the state and provincial levels.  In Nepal, there has 
been no political will to end the civil war and to implement pro-poor policies. In these 
conditions the PRS is of little use, and DFID should concentrate on initiatives which 
points towards a solution of the conflict, and on initiatives which will benefit poor 
people directly. 
 
 
Planning Coherence and Coordination 
 
Principle conclusions:   
1. When the PRS process enfolds within, or is clearly complementary to, 
national planning institutions, it tends to facilitate coherence and coordination 
in the policy process.  This tendency is strengthened if a country has effective 
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planning institutions, and a national poverty reduction strategy preceded the 
PRS process. 
2. Improvements in implementation, which in the context of political will and 
commitment, can be fostered through capacity building and transfer of 
knowledge, are more important in the short and medium term than seeking 
integration of the current and capital budgets, the potential for which at the 
national level is limited. 
3. Planning coherence and coordination must be linked to the implementation 
of pro-poor polices. In extreme cases where other political and military 
considerations override the commitment to pro-poor policies the value of 
increased coherence and coordination is doubtful. 
 
The necessary condition for the PRS process, or any new policy initiative, to 
foster coherence and coordination is that be integrated into the existing policy making 
structure.  The creation of new institutions, or the assignation of the PRS process to 
agencies or ministries without previous poverty remit, creates debilitating duplicate 
and competitive lines of management and responsibility.   
 
It is a mistake to respond to the weakness of existing planning institutions by 
creating a PRS unit outside of these.  Using the existing planning institutions creates 
the likelihood that the weaknesses of those institutions will undermine or substantially 
alter the goals of the PRS process.  However, the same weaknesses are likely to 
manifest themselves in alternative institutions, with the added problem of institutional 
duplication. 
 
 As part of improving planning coherence and coordination, the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) offers a mechanism to link the programmes in PRSPs 
to annual budgets.  However, not all governments would endorse this fiscal 
management mechanism at the national level..  The situation in Vietnam is more open, 
but donors & lenders are unlikely to have an impact on fiscal management.  There is 
some scope for encouraging greater transparency in the national budget.  Nominally, 
the government of Nepal has adopted the use of the MTEF, but the impact on 
controlling fiscal practice related to implementation is minor, if not nil. 
 
 
Contribution to Poverty Analysis 
  
 Principle conclusions: 
1. The PRS process is an effective mechanism for transferring analytical and 
empirical information about poverty reduction across countries. 
2. Donor & lender support for data collection, including technical advice, can 
substantially contribute to the quality of poverty diagnosis, especially when 
the support is closely linked to on-going national data collection. 
 
 The transfer of international expertise on poverty analysis has been the most 
successful aspect of the PRS process.  An extremely fruitful lever of change available 
to DFID is to devolve this transfer to the state level in India and to provincial 
administrations in Vietnam.  The impact of international expertise and ‘best practice’ 
can be found in the Nepal PRSP (Five Year Plan), but this has not substantially 
affected policy design or improved implementation.   
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Consultation and Participation 
1. The involvement of civil society in the PRS process, including the poor, 
should move beyond consultation to interactive participation.   
2. The participation process should be nationally owned, managed and 
evaluated from beginning to end.   
3. Mechanisms are needed to translate participation into impact on policy.   
4. The participation process should reinforce each country’s formal 
representative institutions, and close links to national parliaments is especially 
important. 
 
 While Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) rarely meet the criteria 
enumerated above, they can provide quite useful information as inputs into analysis 
and diagnosis of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty.  DFID’s support of these 
assessments enhanced the PRS process in Vietnam, and made a substantial 
contribution to subsequent policy discussions.  Such assessments should not be 
confused with the participation process mandated by the World Bank’s PRSP 
guidelines. 
 
 One way to deepen and make more effective participation exercises would be 
to link them directly to the role of parliament in the PRS process.  One advantage of 
this approach is that it opens a legitimate capacity building role for donors & lenders 
that can strengthen representative institutions with minimal interference in national 
politics. Lessons can be learned from the Indian Five Year Plan preparation model 
which includes the participation of non-government experts and activists, and which 
involve the government and the parliament directly in the process. 
 
Poverty Monitoring 
  
 Principle conclusions: 
 To foster credibility in poverty reduction policies, DFID support should be 
given to PRS monitoring, at the national and provincial/state levels, and to 
independent research organisations of civil society, as well as governments. 
 
 The PRS process seeks to create a planning framework that will reduce 
poverty faster, more effectively and in a sustainable manner than would be possible in 
its absence.  Therefore, a central element is monitoring of processes and outcomes.  
Monitoring within the PRS process should not be viewed within the static 
project/programme cycle of conceptualisation, formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation, but as activities that crosscut each of these phases.  
 If the PRS process achieves its goal of broad-based participation of civil 
society, then monitoring becomes a joint exercise of governments and civil society to 
foster credibility.  Organisation of the PRS process in which the government has final 
decision over policy design and implementation, and monitors the outcome would 
result in a conflict of interest, since governments typically seek to demonstrate the 
success of their policies.  Therefore, monitoring policy outcomes by civil society 
organisations is a necessary complement to similar work within governments. 
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Reform of the PRS Process 
Looking to the Future 
 
 Anticipating the future trends and impact of the PRS process remains 
speculative.  We consider two ‘scenarios’:  1) the ‘minor impact’ scenario in which 
the changes fostered by the PRS process are minor, limited to technical aspects of the 
planning process;  and 2) the ‘major impact’ scenario, in which the tendency is for 
basic principles of the PRSP guidelines to be realised.    
 
 In the minor impact scenario the major parties to the PRS process, the 
government and donors & lenders, emphasise and interpret the principles to conform to 
the institutional interests of each.  The positive results of this scenario would be: 1) the 
acquisition of useful information from Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs);  2) 
poverty impact monitoring of government programmes and projects;  3) improved aid 
coordination;  4) a more sophisticated definition and approach to poverty reduction;  
and 5) some degree of improved integration of annual budgets with medium and long 
term expenditure plans.  These positive outcomes would not constitute a fundamental 
change in national ownership, because the basic policy agenda would remain driven by 
donor & lenders priorities, albeit adjusted at the margin for national circumstances.  
The PRS goal of ‘broad-based’ participation would not be realised, and the design of 
poverty reduction programmes would remain a technical exercise by experts.  Donors 
& lenders and recipient governments would find themselves playing familiar roles.   
 
 In the major impact scenario the behaviour of the principle parties to the PRS 
undergoes fundamental change.  All parties interpret national ownership to mean that 
the recipient government has final decision over policies, which donors & lenders 
accept, and participation means active engagement of civil society with government for 
a national debate on development priorities.  This mandate from civil society makes it 
inappropriate for donors & lenders to go beyond discussion and consultation.  In some 
countries this strategy would include policies which donors & lenders previously 
refused to support.  The change in development partnerships would go beyond 
administrative coordination to create a more effective form of donor-government 
dialogue.   A multi-dimensional approach would lead to less reliance on income 
measures of poverty, and greater commitment to the type of targets found in the 
Millennium Development Goals.   
 
 Which of these scenarios will occur will depend on three principle factors:  1) 
the approach adopted by donors & lenders;  2) the political commitment and 
administrative capacity of recipient governments; and 3) the political will of 
governments to implement pro-poor policies.  For DFID, the broad policy question is 
to which scenario it seeks to influence the dynamics of the PRS process.   
 
Process Changes to Enhance Value Added 
 
 We have stressed positive aspects of the PRS process arising from the case 
studies. 
 
1) The PRS principles are sound, and can provide a value added to poverty 
reduction.  The weaknesses of the PRS process primarily result from the 
inflexibility of its formal guidelines. 
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2) In all three countries donors and lenders accepted established planning 
institutions as the management units, rather than seeking to create new 
institutions or processes.  The PRS process built upon existing planning 
experience and procedures. 
3) The potential for the PRS process to improve the relationship between 
recipient governments and donors and lenders is being realised, albeit slowly 
and incompletely. 
 
 To deepen these positive develops, several framework changes are required in 
the PRS process: 
 
1. As currently designed, the PRS framework is excessive in its 
standardisation (‘one size fits all’), and should be adapted to each country’s 
political circumstances; 
2. PRSPs should primarily be national documents aimed at the domestic 
audience, and secondarily documents to attract development assistance; and 
3.  Among donors & lenders the framework of PRSs should be reformed to be 
consistent with equal partnership among donors and lenders, which may imply 
delinking it from direct multilateral funding. 
 
These framework changes imply procedural changes: 
 
1. Parliaments should be intimately involved in the PRS process, including 
drafting and approving the final document; 
2. When a poverty reduction strategy exists, this should be treated by donors 
as the basis for the PRS process, without requiring a separate exercise; 
3. All programmes proposed in a PRSP should be justified by an assessment of 
the capacity to implement them (though this need not be part of the document 
itself); and 
4. Because it is essential that the participation process be country owned and 
sustainable, external agencies should avoid becoming involved except through 
indirect support.  This reform would not rule out PPAs that are primarily 
information gathering exercises.  
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 1. Context of the Report 
  
 1.1 The Purpose of the PRS Process 
 
 The PRS is a partnership-based approach to the challenge of reducing poverty 
in low-income countries that seeks to empower country stakeholders, both in 
government and civil society, in designing their strategies.  Nationally owned poverty 
reduction strategies are at the heart of this new approach, with an explicit rejection of 
the previous ‘donorship’ approach.1  At the World Summit for Social Development 
(WSSD) held in Copenhagen in 1995, heads of state and representatives from 180 
countries committed themselves to ‘formulating or strengthening national poverty 
eradication plans to address the structural causes of poverty'.  In its response to the 
commitments taken at WSSD, a multi-donor & lender initiative was launched in 1996, 
the Poverty Strategies Initiatives (PSI) programme in 1996.  This programme 
supported country efforts to develop national and local anti-poverty strategies, and to 
identify and monitor the causes and nature of absolute poverty.  The programme, 
offered in more than 100 countries, had two main goals: 1) the establishment of the 
technical, institutional and political basis for policy action, and 2) civil society 
mobilisation to broaden public discussion of poverty. 
 
Following its mandate to integrate the objectives of poverty reduction and 
growth more fully into its operations in its poorest member countries, the IMF 
established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999, replacing the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. Programmes supported by the PRGF and 
IDA (International Development Association, the World Bank's concessional window) 
must be framed around a comprehensive, nationally owned PRSP prepared by the 
borrowing country.  The PRSP is then reviewed by the Boards of the IMF and World 
Bank, in their respective areas of responsibility, as the basis for the institutions' 
concessional loans and for relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. The PRS 
approach also stresses the underlying principle that national poverty strategies should 
foster domestic and external partnerships that improve the effectiveness of 
development assistance. Many bilateral donors have joined the partnerships in support 
of the PRS approach. 
 
When successful, the PRS process promotes poverty reduction strategies that 
are country driven, comprehensive, set clear priorities, partnership based, and framed 
within a long-term perspective.  Major features of the PRSP are that it should contain 
an analytical framework, integrating macroeconomic, structural, sectoral, and social 
considerations.  At the end of 2003, over thirty countries had completed full PRSPs 
and over fifty had in place Interim-PRSPs.2 As this evaluation points out, the 
expectations about the nature, scope, and thrust of PRS have been partially realised. 
                                                 
1 We define a donorship approach as characterised by some or all of the following:  1) the 
determination of the amount and composition of assistance is primarily a unilateral decision on the part 
of the donor or lender;  2) most assistance is for projects rather than programmes;  3) programme 
assistance is accompanied by performance conditionalities primarily determined by the donor or lender; 
4) the composition of development assistance is treated as technical exercise for experts with minimal 
consultation with civil society; and 5) the donor or lender defines a set of ‘sound’ against which the 
policies of the recipient government are judged. 
2 Source: World Bank Web site.  Since the preparation of full PRSPs proved a complex process taking 
longer than a year, and some countries were in need of interim debt relief, Interim PRSPs were created.  
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 The many roles played by PRSPs are summarised in the PRSP Sourcebook of 
the World Bank.  After listing ‘six key outcomes’ that a PRSP should achieve, the 
document adds four areas that they should cover: 
 
1. Macro and structural policies to support sustainable growth; 
2. How to improve governance, including public sector financial management; 
3. Appropriate sectoral policies and programmes; and 
4. Realistic costing and appropriate levels of funding for the major 
programmes. 
 
 Within this broad agenda, point one above raises the possibility that PRSPs 
might become macroeconomic frameworks largely determined by the conditionalities 
associated with a country’s prevailing or anticipated IMF and World Bank 
programmes.  However, the PRS’s potential advance on previous, donor-driven 
assistance is that such conditionalities would be derivative from the poverty reduction 
strategy in the document.  This change is of central importance, because in the past 
macro programmes have tended to be short term in nature, with emphasis on 
stabilisation.  The PRS philosophy explicitly revises this emphasis, and calls for the 
macro policies to ‘support sustainable growth’.   
 
A review of completed PRSs indicates that this change of emphasis is a work in 
progress.  In the PRSP handbook itself, one finds relatively little discussion of how 
growth might be promoted, with the exception of a preference for so-called structural 
reforms such as trade and exchange rate liberalisation (World Bank 2001).  If the past 
emphasis on macro stability were unchanged, an inherent tension would be created in 
the documents, since their short term character would not correspond to the long term 
nature of poverty reduction.   
 
 1.2 The Dynamics of the PRS Process 
 
The PRS process has the potential to change the relationship between 
government and donors & lenders, and between governments and civil society.  It is a 
political process aimed at empowering governments to set their own priorities in the 
dialogue with donors & lenders;  and facilitate civil society groups in influencing those 
priorities.  Therefore, it has a dynamic which is particular to each country, determined 
by the existing political institutions and the strength of civil society. 
 
While the PRSP concept arose first in the Fund, in practice it is considerably 
more important to the operations of the Bank.  For the IMF, only loans under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility depend upon a country producing a PRSP.  
The more familiar stand-by loans and their conditionalities found in Letters of Intent 
are unaffected by the existence or contents of PRSPs.  For many countries, the PRGF 
loans will be considerably less important than other IMF lending.  In any case, all IMF 
lending goes to supplement a government’s foreign reserve position.  The role of the 
PRSP is quite different for the World Bank.  A government must have a PRSP or an 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in place in order for the Bank to initiate a 
                                                                                                                                            
These are short documents that describe a country's poverty situation, and present a plan for preparation 
of the PRSP. I-PRSPs qualify countries for the decision point under HIPC. 
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country programme, with these constructed on the basis of civil society consultation or 
participation (this distinction is discussed below).  As a result, there is potential, not 
always realised, for the PRS process to be led from the donor and lender side by the 
World Bank.   
 
The great importance of the PRSP to the institutional mission of the World 
Bank might give rise to conflict of interest.  This potential conflict has two aspects, 
internal to the Bank and in its relationship to other donors & lenders.  An internal 
conflict of interest may arise because, after participating in the formulation of a PRSP 
at the country level, the Bank then reviews the document critically at the Executive 
Board level.  In its relationship to other donors & lenders, the Bank at the country level 
may find criticisms of the PRSP drafts as obstacles to completion rather than as 
constructive contributions.  This potential conflict of interest has important 
implications for DFID, which we elaborate in the case of Vietnam and DFID’s co-
funding with the Bank. 
 
 Pressure to complete PRSPs may result in the process of drafting the document 
creating or exacerbating tensions among government ministries and agencies.  In order 
for the PRS to contribute to effective policy making, it must incorporate priorities.  
Reaching consensus on priorities among ministries requires a sometimes lengthy 
process of negotiation.  Intervention by an outside agency in this process can alter the 
relative balance of influence among ministries in an unpredictable manner not 
necessarily to DFID’s benefit in its dialogue with governments. 
 
 Evidence of these difficulties can be found in a number of countries (UNDP 
2003), and we report examples in Nepal and Vietnam.  In themselves they need not 
seriously affect the PRS process, but they can substantially affect the extent to which 
PRSs enhance or weaken the national strategy process.  Quite important for DFID, 
they affect the extent to which bilateral donors & lenders are able to pursue their 
institutional goals within the PRS process. 
 
 The difficulties arise in the context of the improvement in the relationship 
between donors & lenders and recipient governments that PRSs can and have brought 
about.  While various donors & lenders, notably DFID, have for some years stressed 
the importance of country ownership and stakeholder participation in developing 
national poverty strategies, the PRS process gives these principles added legitimacy, 
and creates more space for recipient governments to set national development agendas.  
This new and greater emphasis on national ownership, and especially participation, 
implies that the PRS process has ‘a life of its own’, in that it fosters a debate whose 
outcome is inherently dynamic and non-predictable.  It also implies that donors & 
lenders, and also governments, have implicitly relaxed some of their control over 
national strategy design.  Space is created for the institutionalisation of a broad policy 
debate over national priorities. 
 
 We can conclude this discussion with the following summary.  When 
considering the PRS framework, emphasis should not be placed on the document that 
is generated, but rather on the process by which that document is produced, and the 
ongoing planning, implementation and monitoring that flows from it.  The document 
itself is the pivot on which planning, implementation, and monitoring turn.  In this 
process, the engagement of civil society creates its own dynamic, a ‘life of its own’, 
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which is influenced but not controlled by governments and international agencies, 
though control may be attempted.  At the same time, the dynamics within governments 
are altered, partly due to the formal organisation of the process, but, more importantly, 
as a result of the participation by civil society.   
 
 The PRS emerges from a long and purposeful international process that began 
at least as early as the Human Development Report of 1990.  It is not merely the latest 
fad in the donor and lender community.  The PRS has created a new dynamic in the 
national strategy process, which potentially will be participatory and country-driven.  
The principle issue is what DFID can do to aid the realisation of the considerable 
potential of the PRS process to achieve poverty reduction and more effective policy 
formulation.  In our view, to realise the positive potential of PRS, several 
characteristics of the process should be adjusted or reformed, and DFID can play an 
important part in fostering these. 
 
 
 1.3 Analytical Approach 
 
 There is no consensus in the policy literature as to how the PRS process 
should be evaluated, though agreement is emerging that evaluations should focus on 
process rather than outcome.  Our approach considers the extent to which a PRS 
altered policy;  and whether it did so in a manner that made policy more pro-poor.  
However, we do not judge the PRS process by the yardstick of improvement in the 
well-being of the poor (i.e., poverty reduction), because it is too early to do so, and 
because this criterion would impart a strong negative bias to the assessment.3  A 
variety of factors impact upon poverty reduction, including ones over which the 
government may have little influence via policy.  For example, sorting out the effect 
of policy from influences such as the terms of trade, or political instability and 
conflict, is difficult enough, and attempting to identify PRS effects within policy 
would be impossible.  In light of this, our assessment criterion begins with the 
following necessary condition: 
 
A PRS contributes positively to the formulation of a national policy strategy 
for poverty reduction if it results in a more poverty focussed policy framework 
than would have been the case in its absence. 
 
 If this criterion is met, the analysis moves on to the following questions, which 
if answered positively provide sufficient conditions to judge a PRS to have added 
value to the national policy process: 
 
1. Was the process nationally owned and country driven, which are essential 
to commitment to implementation?   
2. Is the PRS integrated into the strategic planning framework, including links 
to fiscal instruments (annual budgets and medium term expenditure reviews)?    
And 
                                                 
3 In a recent contribution to the discussion, Levinsohn sets the following criterion: 
To really evaluate the PRSP approach, it is necessary to compare outcomes to what would have 
happened but for the PRSP’s implementation…whether the PRSP process is really addressing 
the concerns of the poor…[and] changes in their well-being… (Levinsohn 2003, vii) 
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3. Is PRS consistent with and does it improve national capacity to implement 
programmes and monitor outcomes?   
 
 In addition to the above, we consider the contribution of the PRS process to 
the understanding of poverty in each country, and the extent to which the process was 
consultative, participatory, and raised public awareness of poverty issues. 
 
 It is important to clarify the distinction between the PRS process being 
nationally owned and country driven.  The term ‘nationally owned’ is typically used 
to refer to whether the contents of a PRSP were written by and under the direction and 
supervision of the government.  Such could be the case if the primary reason for the 
production of the PRSP were to meet donor conditionality and curry donor favour.  As 
a result, the PRSP could be essentially a donor document, making no substantial 
contribution to national policy even if it were entirely the work of the government.  
Some might object to the forgoing on the grounds that it does not matter why a 
government writes a PRSP as long as the outcome is a greater policy focus on poverty 
reduction.  This instrumentalist argument places emphasis on the document rather 
than the process.  If a government writes a PRSP primarily to obtain donor and lender 
funding, it is unlikely to have a serious commitment to the policies in the document; 
or, the policies will be ones the government would have implemented in the absence 
of a PRSP.  The PRS process is country driven when is initiated and pursued by a 
government in order to bring a significant change in the debate over national policy, 
policies themselves, and the effective implementation of those policies. 
 
 A PRS can be nationally owned and country driven, but fail to contribute to an 
effective poverty reduction strategy because it is not integrated into the national 
budgetary system. This would be the case if the government gave its support to the 
process, but did not adjust administrative structures to achieve its integration into the 
policy process.  In the absence of this integration, the PRS could make national policy 
less effective, by undermining the overall coherence of the policy process.  The PRS 
process might create parallel and competing policy making units, with different 
priorities and uncoordinated budgets.  Third, even country driven and integrated into 
the overall planning system, a PRSP must be consistent with national capabilities in 
order to contribute to effective policy.  Innovative and pro-poor programmes 
undermine policy making if they cannot be effectively implemented or their outcomes 
cannot be closely monitored. 
 
 Using these analytical guidelines, we review the PRS process in Nepal and 
Vietnam.  For India, the guidelines are different, but closely linked.  The government 
of India and the World Bank have agreed that the present Five Year Plan is the 
country’s PRSP.  In many respects the Plan differs from other PRSPs, but it 
incorporates the key PRSP principles.  For India the questions are as follows:  first, to 
what extent did the PRS approach influence the present Five Year Plan;  and second, 
if the government of India had formally to entered into the PRS process, would the 
national poverty reduction strategy be enhanced?   
 
 In addition to the evidence from the three case studies commissioned by 
DFID, the discussion will draw on the experience of other countries that were 
evaluated by one or more authors of this study (see table in Annex 1).  Review of 
the countries suggests that there are two national structural characteristics that 
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have a major impact on the dynamics of the PRS process.   These are:  1) the 
degree of government ownership of its development strategy prior to the PRS 
process, which is related to dependency on donors & lenders;  and 2) the 
existence of a national poverty strategy prior to the PRS process.  These cross-
cutting issues are treated throughout the discussion of major findings. 
 
 
 
2. Main Findings 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
  
 This is a report on three Asian countries.  One must be cautious about making 
generalisations for any region.  However, the inclusion of Nepal with India and 
Vietnam may give the impression of a larger incidence of aid dependency than is 
typically the case in the region.  With few exceptions, Asian countries are not aid 
dependent, and donors & lenders have limited impact on government policies.  
Therefore, in most Asian countries, donors such as DFID which typically seek to 
influence overall development policies based on their strong financial, political and 
professional position, would need to look at the dialogue with governments in a 
different way. Indeed, attempts by external agencies to influence policy based on their 
perceived position of strength could and have had an effect opposite to that intended, 
by provoking a strong nationalist reaction.  It is more productive to speak of external 
agencies ‘contributing to’ or ‘having an impact on’ the policy process through indirect 
means such as capacity building, technical advice, knowledge sharing and innovative 
programmes and projects. 
 
 Another characteristic of many Asian countries is a tradition of 
institutionalised medium and long term planning through agencies created explicitly 
for this purpose.  These exist in all three of the case study countries.  As a result, there 
is both considerable expertise (less so in Nepal), and considerable institutional vested 
interest in the design, implementation and monitoring of policy. 
 
The level of poverty in Asian countries is less than in Sub-Saharan countries, 
and Asian poverty is often related to social segregation and elite rule. This poses 
specific challenges to the implementation of PRSs in Asia. Nepal is case in point, with 
a country-wide Maoist armed struggle against the government adding to already 
existing implementation problems. 
 
 With these points in mind, we move to the major findings of this study, 
reported under four broad topics.   The impact of the PRS process on relations with 
donors & lenders is considered first in order to assess the central issue of government 
ownership of programmes.  Also considered in this discussion are ‘political will’ and 
‘commitment’ to poverty reduction and policy implementation.  This leads logically to 
the second major topic, the extent to which the PRS process contributed to greater 
coherence and coordination in planning.  The adequacy or otherwise of administrative 
capacity is a key part of this coherence and coordination, as is the effectiveness of 
national planning institutions.  Third, the contribution of the PRS to poverty analysis is 
assessed, which is strongly influenced by whether a country had a national poverty 
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strategy prior to the PRS process.  Finally, the discussion turns to consultation, 
participation, and public awareness, in which the effects of conflict arises. 
 
 This report cannot pass judgement on the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the PRS 
process, because the process has not had time to manifest its principle tendencies in 
each country, much less to warrant a cross-country conclusion.  At most, one can 
identify tendencies within the process, strengths and weaknesses as it has unfolded in 
each concrete circumstance.  In this approach, we can use the phrase ‘value added by 
the PRS process’ in more than a purely metaphorical sense;  i.e., the relevant question 
is the extent to which the PRS process has added value, or enhanced, an on-going 
exercise in the production of policies for poverty reduction. 
 
 
  
 2.2 Donor & Lender Relations with Governments  
 
Principle conclusions:   
 
1. The most important contribution of the PRS process to development 
partnerships has been its tendency to foster government ownership of 
development policy. 
2. In cases when governments have national poverty strategies in place before 
the PRS process, government ownership is strengthened when donors & 
lenders accept these as the basis for the PRSP document, adapted as necessary. 
 
 The PRS process incorporates the judgements that national ownership of 
development policy is a desirable goal in itself, and results in greater effectiveness of 
policy.  National ownership of development policy, within the PRS process and in 
general, requires supportive behaviour on the part of both governments and donors & 
lenders.   Thus, a brief analytical discussion is necessary prior to elaborating on our 
principle conclusion. 
 
 An essential characteristic of the ‘donorship regime’ was judgementalism by 
donors & lenders.  The donor or lender reserved the right to pass its judgement on the 
appropriateness of and commitment to recipient government policies.  In a national 
ownership regime, assessment of policies passes to the recipient government, with 
consultation with the donor.  The donor presumption of a unique set of sound policies 
rests on the following logic: 
 
1. There exist a set of sound policies that the donors know and recipient 
governments do not (the recipient is ignorant); 
2. That recipient governments must not only be informed of the sound policies 
of which they are ignorant, but require convincing of the need to implement 
these (in the absence of donor advocacy, the recipient lacks the judgement to 
distinguish good policies from bad ones); and,  
3. In the past development failures arose from the mistakes of omission or 
commission of recipient governments, not in whole or part the result of 
unsound policies of the donors (development failures are recipient government 
failures). 
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While such an attitude does not change quickly, we find considerable evidence 
that the PRS process has generated a policy dialogue between development agencies 
and governments that is more partnership-based and consultative, rather than 
unilaterally judgemental.  National ownership does not require DFID or other 
agencies to suspend all judgements; rather, it implies that those judgements arise out 
of an interactive process with national stakeholders.   This approach to partnership 
admits the possibility that national policy makers and representatives of civil society 
have knowledge of the country that can complement and in some circumstances 
supersede that of external agencies. 
 
 A more subtle variation on the sound policies criticism of recipient 
governments is that they may be aware of the policies, and aware of the need for 
them, but fail to implement them because of special interests within or outside of the 
government.  In such circumstances, the argument goes, donors & lenders are justified 
in their criticism of policy choices, and the criticism may strengthen domestic 
supporters of sound policies.  This argument is also in the tradition of donorship, for it 
implicitly suggests that institutional, political, and economic interests do not motivate 
donors.   
 
The ownership equivalent of the ‘sound policies’ statement would be: ‘donors 
and recipient governments should engage in dialogue to identify sound policies on the 
part of each, and each should be convinced of the need to implement these’.  It is our 
impression that such a statement represents DFID’s approach to development 
assistance in India, Nepal and Vietnam. 
 
 However, failures of implementation raise important issues for donors & 
lenders, since it is consistent with national ownership that they would wish to see their 
funds used effectively.  It is in the context of effective use of funds that the terms 
‘political will’ and ‘political commitment’ can be usefully considered.  In the absence 
of concrete specification of the political context in which a government operates, the 
term ‘political will’ has limited meaning.  For example, two governments in 
parliamentary democracies may be faced with similarly difficult and politically 
controversial economic decisions.  If one government has a large majority and the 
other a tiny one, it is not analytically useful to accuse the latter of a lack of political 
will for not implementing a controversial policy.  The problem may not be a lack of 
will on the part of the current government, but a lack of effective power.  Further, 
political will is not static, but is determined by the political and social context.  With 
few exceptions, it is invalid to ascribe the presence or absence of political will to 
governments in general; partly because governments are not monolithic structures, 
and partly because the political and social context is dynamic. 
 
 The term ‘commitment’ is essential to the analysis of effective use of 
development assistance.  Like political will, it is dynamic rather than static.  Too 
often, the term is used as a binary category  (a government or other stakeholder has or 
does not have commitment), or as category characterised by degrees (e.g., low, 
medium, high).  Neither incorporates the basic principle that all social phenomena are 
constrained.  The productive way to consider commitment is not to ask, what are the 
constraints on the actor in question to implement her/his commitment?  Commitment 
to a project or programme implies that the stakeholder will devote resources to it.  
Since resources are scarce, it is rational for stakeholders to ration commitment; in 
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other words, to maximise their commitment with respect to the resource constraints 
that impinge on them. 
 
 The approach avoids the moralistic subtext in discussions of commitment, and 
makes commitment an issue that DFID can address within the PRS process.  If DFID 
anticipates a problem of stakeholder commitment, this can be managed, first by 
identifying the constraints to increasing commitment.  If these are concrete resource 
constraints, then it may be possible to address them within the country assistance 
programme, for example, through capacity building.  Using this approach, 
commitment is no longer an ex post excuse for lack of project or programme success, 
but an element to include in the design of an activity.  It is this approach we take in 
our discussion of ownership. 
 
 
2.3 Planning Coherence and Coordination 
 
Principle conclusions:  
  
1. When the PRS process enfolds within, or is clearly complementary to, 
national planning institutions, it tends to facilitate coherence and coordination 
in the policy process.  This tendency is strengthened if a country has effective 
planning institutions, and a national poverty reduction strategy preceded the 
PRS process. 
2. Improvements in implementation, which in the context of political will and 
commitment, can be fostered through capacity building and transfer of 
knowledge, are more important in the short and medium term than seeking 
integration of the current and capital budgets, the potential for which at the 
national level is limited. 
3. Planning coherence and coordination must be linked to the implementation 
of pro-poor polices. In extreme cases where other political and military 
considerations override the commitment to pro-poor policies the value of 
increased coherence and coordination is doubtful.  
 
We take planning coherence and coordination to include the design, 
implementation and monitoring of policy.  The necessary condition for the PRS 
process, or any new policy initiative, to foster coherence and coordination is that it be 
integrated into the existing policy making structure.  The creation of new institutions, 
or the assignation of the PRS process to agencies or ministries without previous 
poverty remit, creates debilitating duplicate and competitive lines of management and 
responsibility.   
 
It is a mistake to respond to the weakness of existing planning institutions by 
creating a PRS unit outside of these.  Using the existing planning institutions creates 
the likelihood that the weaknesses of those institutions will undermine or substantially 
alter the goals of the PRS process.  However, the same weaknesses are likely to 
manifest themselves in alternative institutions, with the added problem of institutional 
duplication. 
 
As part of improving planning coherence and coordination, the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) offers a mechanism to link the programmes in 
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PRSPs to annual budgets.  The government of Nepal has put a MTEF in place, and 
formally it is appropriately designed for the purpose.  However, it is difficult to assess 
the impact of this and other planning management mechanisms in Nepal because of 
serious implementation problems of almost all aspects of planning.  In other words, 
one cannot judge whether the ineffectiveness of the MTEF arises from this tool itself, 
or from other, more basic factors in the political economy of policy making in Nepal.  
In Vietnam the MTEF mechanism is at an early stage, after a previous attempt to 
institute it was abandoned.  Perhaps more important than the MTEF itself has been the 
government’s decision to eliminate some of the secrecy associated with the annual 
fiscal budget.4  This change, which lays the basis for greater coordination among 
ministries, resulted in part from donor & lender pressure within the PRS process.  
India has no MTEF, and is unlikely to do so under the current institutional structure of 
policy making.  
 
While integration of current and capital budgets is desirable in the long term, 
the potential for DFID to influence this change in the short and medium term is quite 
limited.  In India and some other countries in Asia (for example, Pakistan), the 
division of labour among policy making institutions creates vented interests in the 
partition of current and capital budgets.  Fostering this integration is part of a long-
term process of institutional change that will arise in the context of well-established 
partnerships in which the pressure for such change must be nationally driven.  More 
important and fruitful in the short and medium term will be improvement in PRS 
implementation, which can be supported through capacity building and transfer of 
‘best practice’ experience. 
 
  
2.4 Contribution to Poverty Analysis   
 
Principle conclusions: 
 
1. The PRS process is an effective mechanism for transferring analytical and 
empirical information about poverty reduction across countries. 
2. Donor & lender support for data collection, including technical advice, can 
substantially contribute to the quality of poverty diagnosis, especially when 
the support is closely linked to on-going national data collection. 
 
 The transfer of international expertise on poverty analysis has been the most 
successful aspect of the PRS process.  An extremely fruitful lever of change available 
to DFID is to devolve this transfer to the state level in India and to provincial 
administrations in Vietnam.  The impact of international expertise and ‘best practice’ 
can be found in the Nepal PRSP (Five Year Plan), but this has not substantially 
improved implementation.   
 
 Where there is political will for and commitment to poverty reduction, as in 
Vietnam and, to some extent / in some parts of India, DFID support in the forms of 
capacity building for poverty analysis (in government and civil society), data 
collection (e.g., agricultural and industrial surveys in Vietnam), and transfer of 
international expertise can make a substantial contribution to poverty diagnosis and 
                                                 
4 Until 2002, the entire budget was a state secret. 
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policy design.  This has been demonstrated in Vietnam, where in consultation with 
donors & lenders, the government adopted international standards for its poverty 
definition in the three national household surveys (1992, 1997 and 2002). 
 
 
2.5 Consultation and Participation  
 
Principle conclusions:   
 
1. The involvement of civil society in the PRS process, including the poor, 
should move beyond consultation to interactive participation.   
2. The participation process should be nationally owned, managed and 
evaluated from beginning to end.   
3. Mechanisms are needed to translate participation into impact on the policy.   
4. The participation process should reinforce each country’s formal 
representative institutions, and close links to national parliaments is especially 
important. 
 
The complexity of participation requires a brief analytical discussion for 
background to our conclusions.  The PRS process and the associated shift towards 
budget support by many donors & lenders has important implications for the nature of 
consultation and participation.  The approach that the ‘direct beneficiaries’ of an 
development activities ‘should have their voices heard’ arose in the context of project 
assistance.  The shift to programme support the concept of direct beneficiaries non-
operational.  Under programme assistance, participation becomes part of the general 
process of the relationship between the government and civil society, rather than as ad 
hoc consultations over specific products and services.  Stakeholder participation 
would be satisfactory or unsatisfactory depending on the extent to which, and 
mechanisms by which, government is responsible to civil society.  Depending on the 
strength and nature of formal representative institutions, ad hoc participation 
mechanisms may or may not be necessary or appropriate. 
 
In India, the existing Five Year Plan preparation process institutionalises the 
participation of civil society experts and activists. The Five Year Plan is also tabled in 
and discussed by Parliament.5 
 
Since the participation process is part of the construction of democratic 
institutions in general, this is an area into which donors & lenders, as well as 
developed country NGOs, should enter with greatest caution.  The country studies 
suggest the following reasons for caution.  A consideration of the conditions under 
which a government would ask and agree for an outside agency to organise a 
consultation or participation exercise raises doubts about its usefulness.  One can 
identify three possible reasons:  1) for technical or financial reasons, the government 
cannot organise the exercise itself; 2) for political reasons, the government is 
unwilling to organise the exercise; or 3) a consultation or participation exercise 
organised by the government would not yield results credible to donors & lenders, or 
the national stakeholders.    In all of these circumstances, it is unlikely that a 
                                                 
5 A similar process exists in Nepal but it has been suspended since the King dismissed the government 
in 2002. 
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government would take serious note of the results of the exercises, except in so far as 
they confirmed its ex ante predilections.  The key issue is ownership: by definition, 
consultation and participation over government policies require interaction between 
the citizenry and governments;  exercises organised by outside agencies are not 
government owned;  indeed, they may not be owned by those consulted, either. 
 
A further drawback of externally administered consultation is that they cannot 
be institutionalised.  This requires the participants contribute to the design of the 
exercise, and the government take sets to sustain them.6  Ideally, civil society 
involvement in the PRS should conform to the following elements of good practice: 
1. the exercise should be designed by the participants, and institutionalised by 
the government; 
2. the participants should organise themselves and prepare themselves for the 
formal meetings through review and discussion of policy documents, which 
should be made available to participants well before the meetings with the 
government; 
3. the participatory structure should allow for decisions to be reached, with 
these formally passed to the government by the participants themselves;  and 
4. the government should establish a mechanism by which the decisions of the 
participatory meetings are formally considered by policy making bodies (e.g., 
parliaments).7 
 
 Some might argue that this list of requirements is too strict, especially for 
consultations which are essentially technical, aiming to identify the causes and 
characteristics of poverty from local experience.  Our studies suggest that 
consultations to provide inputs into economic and social policy are never purely 
technical, but always have a political element.   
 
 While Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) rarely meet the criteria 
enumerated above, they can provide quite useful information as inputs into analysis 
and diagnosis of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, as shown in the Vietnam 
Development Report of 2003 (World Bank, et. al. 2003).  DFID’s support of these 
assessments enhanced the PRSP (whose official name was the Comprehensive 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy), and made a substantial contribution to 
subsequent policy discussions.  Such assessments should not be confused with the 
participation process mandated by the World Bank’s PRSP guidelines. 
 
 One way to deepen and make more effective participation exercises would be 
to link them directly to the role of parliament in the PRS process. Here, lessons can be 
learned from the Indian Plan preparation process. One advantage of this approach is 
that it opens a legitimate capacity building role for donors & lenders that can 
strengthen representative institutions with minimal interference in national politics. 
 
 
                                                 
6 An example of ‘good practice’ is the participatory process in Bolivia, which was created under the 
HIPC initiative, and carried on into the PRSP process.  Subsequently, the national legislature 
formalised the process into law (UNDP 2003, Vol 2:  Country Reports). 
7 Except for the last item, this list corresponds to the participatory process in Bolivia, which represented 
the first time in the country’s history that indigenous groups played a major role in democratic political 
debate. 
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 2.6 Poverty Monitoring 
 
Principle conclusion: 
 
To foster credibility in poverty reduction policies, DFID support should be 
given to PRS monitoring, at the national and provincial/state levels, and to 
independent research organisations of civil society, as well as governments. 
 
 The PRS process seeks to create a planning framework that will reduce 
poverty faster, more effectively and in a sustainable manner than would be possible in 
its absence.  Therefore, a central element is monitoring of processes and outcomes.  
Monitoring within the PRS process should not be viewed within the static 
project/programme cycle of conceptualisation, formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation, but as activities that crosscut each of these phases.  
 
 If the PRS process achieves its goal of broad-based participation of civil 
society, then monitoring becomes a joint exercise of governments and civil society to 
foster credibility.  Organisation of the PRS process in which the government has final 
decision over policy design and implementation, and monitors the outcome would 
result in a conflict of interest, since governments typically seek to demonstrate the 
success of their policies.  Therefore, monitoring policy outcomes by civil society 
organisations is a necessary complement to similar work within governments.  
Through capacity building and information transfer DFID can make a major 
contribution to creating the potential for civil society organisations to carry out the 
surveys and other research that would be the basis for monitoring poverty outcomes.  
While it does not directly affect the livelihoods of the poor, local applied academic 
research on poverty is an essential input into the effectiveness of civil society to 
engage in policy debate. 
 
 
 
3. Reforms of the PRS Process  
  
 3.1 Looking to the Future 
 
 As mentioned at several points in this report, the PRS process is in an early 
stage in Asia and elsewhere.  If, as intended by the World Bank, the PRS process 
becomes the basic planning framework for poverty reduction in low income countries, 
the current stage of the process is one in which less than a majority of low income 
countries have completed their first such documents, and implementation has only 
begun in those countries.  Therefore, anticipating the future trends and impact of the 
PRS process as it enters subsequent planning rounds remains speculative.  In order to 
give some structure to this speculation, whose purpose is to guide DFID in its work, 
we consider two ‘scenarios’:  1) the ‘minor impact’ scenario in which the changes 
fostered by the PRS process are minor, largely limited to technical aspects of the 
planning process;  and 2) the ‘major impact’ scenario, in which over time the tendency 
is for basic principles of the PRSP guidelines to be realised.  Stated briefly, these 
principles are national ownership, results-oriented outcomes that help the poor, 
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recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, coordinated partnership among 
development agencies and the government, and a long term perspective. 8 
 
 In the minor impact scenario the major parties to the PRS process, the 
government and donors & lenders, emphasise and interpret the principles to conform to 
the institutional interests of each:  donors & lenders interpret national ownership to 
mean recipient government responsibility for and commitment to standard reform 
programmes;9  all parties consider participation to mean consultation;  governments 
interpret ‘outcomes that help the poor’ to mean enhancing the poverty reduction 
component of policies they intended to implement independently of the PRS;  agencies 
and governments treat coordinated partnerships as meaning administrative 
coordination;   all parties endorse the need for a multi-dimensional approach to 
poverty;  and a long term perspective is interpreted to endorse gradualism in poverty-
reducing policy changes. 
 
 The positive results of this scenario would be: 1) the acquisition of useful 
information from Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs);  2) poverty impact 
monitoring of government programmes and projects;  3) improved aid coordination, 
perhaps on terms mutually agreed between governments and donors & lenders;  4) a 
more sophisticated and holistic definition and approach to poverty reduction;  and 5) 
some degree of improved integration of annual budgets with medium and long term 
expenditure plans.  However, these positive outcomes would not constitute a break 
with past practice or the ‘new framework’ for poverty reduction which the PRS 
process intended.   
 
 First, it would not involve a fundamental change in national ownership, 
because the basic policy agenda would remain driven by donor & lenders priorities, 
albeit adjusted at the margin for national circumstances.  To use a common cliché, it 
would not involve donors & lenders ‘letting go’ of the policy agenda.   The PRS goal 
of ‘broad-based’ participation would not be realised, and the design of poverty 
reduction programmes would remain a technical exercise by experts, with inputs from 
stakeholders via PPAs.  Overall, donors & lenders and recipient governments would 
find themselves playing familiar roles.  The PRSPs would be, as many are now, 
macroeconomic programmes derivative from Bank and Fund conditionalities, with a 
                                                 
8 The’ Overview’ chapter of the  World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook states as follows: 
The principles of the PRSP programme suggest that PRSPs should be: 
• country-driven and owned, based on board based participatory processes for 
formulation, implementation and outcome-based progress monitoring; 
• results-oriented, focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor; 
• comprehensive in scope, recognizing the multidimensional nature of the causes of 
poverty and measures to attack it; 
• partnership-oriented, providing a basis for the active, coordinated participation of 
development partners (bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental) in supporting country 
strategies; 
• based on a medium and long term perspective for poverty reduction, recognizing that 
sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved overnight. (World Bank 2001, p. 3) 
 
9 This could be one interpretation of the following passage in the Sourcebook:   
While the shift to country-ownership will allow substantially more leeway in terms of policy 
design and choices [by governments], what is acceptable to the Bank and the Fund boards will 
be based on what the current understanding of international experience suggests is effective in 
lowering poverty. (World Bank 2001, p. 3). 
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greater poverty focus.  With the exception of the narrow interpretation of national 
ownership, this scenario is close to the PRS process in Vietnam during 1999-2003.  It 
might also be the case that the absence of a fundamental change in government 
priorities would reflect a lack of commitment to poverty reduction, which frequently 
requires explicitly confronting those with vested interests in the status quo. 
 
 In the major impact scenario the behaviour of the principle parties to the PRS 
under goes fundamental change.  All parties interpret national ownership to mean that 
the recipient government has final decision over policies, which donors & lenders 
accept after due consultation within the partnership dialogue.  Participation means 
active engagement of civil society with government at the relevant level, and is the 
vehicle for a national debate on development priorities.  Mechanisms are created so 
that this debate has a major impact on policy.  It is this mandate from civil society that 
makes it inappropriate for donors & lenders to go beyond discussion and consultation.  
In effect, donors & lenders face a ‘take it or leave it’ decision on supporting the 
poverty strategy, which is nationally owned and country driven.  In some countries this 
strategy would include policies which donors & lenders previously refused to support.   
 
 ‘Outcomes that help the poor’ would mean that the pattern of growth would be 
pro-poor in the sense that in the annual increment in national income the share of the 
poor (however defined) would increase by more than that of the non-poor.10  
Achieving this would require a combination of targeted and universal entitlement 
programmes, as well as a public investment programme reformulated on the basis of its 
poverty impact.  It would also require improvements in national and sub-national 
policy implementation mechanisms, driven by the government’s commitment to 
poverty reduction.  This might manifest itself in resolution of armed conflicts, 
improvement in governance mechanisms, and better social service delivery.  
 
 The change in development partnerships would go beyond administrative 
coordination to create a more effective form of donor-government dialogue.   A multi-
dimensional approach would lead to less reliance on income measures of poverty, and 
greater commitment to the type of targets found in the Millennium Development 
Goals.  A long term perspective would require a fundamental change in most countries 
of fiscal planning, with annual budgets derivative from medium term expenditure plans 
and long term development strategies.  It would also require a close and effective 
integration of capital and current budgets, within the same planning structure.  Some, 
but far from all of these elements of the major impact scenario can be found in the PRS 
process in Ethiopia, Uganda and Vietnam, and in the Indian approach to planning. 
 
 In most countries, which of these scenarios will occur, in the sense of the 
central tendency of the PRS process, will depend on three principle factors:  1) the 
approach adopted by donors & lenders as a group, since they are the source of external 
funds;  2) the political commitment and administrative capacity of recipient 
governments to implement fundamental change in their planning processes; and 3) the 
political will of governments to implement pro-poor policies.  For DFID, the broad 
policy question is to which scenario it seeks to influence the dynamics of the PRS 
                                                 
10 In algebra, pro-poor growth occurs when: 
[∆Yp/Yp] >[∆Ynp/Ynp], where Y is the share in disposable income, p stands for the poor, and  
np for the non-poor. 
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process.  Choosing one over the other has practical consequences in terms of the 
design of DFID country programmes. 
 
 
 3.2 Process Changes to Enhance Value Added 
 
 The valued added to poverty reduction strategies and planning in general can 
be achieve by several changes in the PRS process, independently of whether DFID 
seeks to foster the minor impact scenario or the major impact scenario.  To place these 
in context, we point out three of the most positive aspects of the PRS process arising 
from the case studies. 
 
1) The PRS principles are sound, and can provide a value added to poverty 
reduction.  The weaknesses of the PRS process primarily result from the 
inflexibility of its formal guidelines. 
2) In all three countries donors and lenders accepted established planning 
institutions as the management units, rather than seeking to create new 
institutions or processes.  Thus the PRS process built upon existing planning 
experience and procedures. 
3) The potential for the PRS process to improve the relationship between 
recipient governments and donors and lenders is being realised, albeit slowly 
and incompletely. 
 
 Framework Changes 
1. As currently designed, the PRS framework is excessive in its 
standardisation of the process (‘one size fits all’). 
 
 The circumstances under which PRSPs are written vary greatly among 
countries.  These include:  HIPC and non-HIPC status; major differences in planning 
capacity; major differences in implementation capacity; fundamental differences in 
political systems; and varying degrees of reliance on external assistance.  These 
differences imply that a specification of the PRS process that seeks to give more than 
general guidance is dysfunctional, resulting in symbolic exercise with little substance. 
 
2.   PRSPs should primarily be national documents aimed at the domestic 
audience, and secondarily documents to attract development assistance. 
 
 Where basic planning procedures and strategy documents exist, as in Asia, the 
PRSP should be derivative from these.  In this circumstance, its fundamental role is to 
inform national stakeholders, and foster discussion and debate over national priorities.  
For donors and lenders, the PRSP would serve as an executive summary of the 
government’s poverty reduction strategy. 
 
3.  Among donors & lenders the framework of PRSs should be reformed to be 
consistent with equal partnership among donors and lenders. 
 
As briefly discussed in Section 1.2, it is generally recognised that the PRS 
process is of greater institutional importance to the World Bank than to other donors 
and lenders.  Even with the best intentions this strong institutional interest tends to 
generate a Bank-driven process among the donors.  This self-interested leadership, 
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inherent in the present framework, tends to undermine long-established relationships 
and relative influence among donors and lenders, sometimes in unpredictable and 
undesired ways.  Reform within the donor & lender community is necessary to make 
the PRS process consistent with equal partnerships among development agencies, 
including the UN system. 
 
 Procedural Changes  
 (implied by the Framework Changes) 
 
1. Parliaments should be intimately involved in the PRS process, including 
drafting and approving the final document. 
2. When a poverty reduction strategy exists, this should be treated by donors 
as the basis for the PRS process, without requiring a separate exercise. 
3. All programmes proposed in a PRSP should be justified by an assessment of 
the capacity to implement them (this need not be in the document itself). 
4. Because it essential that the consultation and participation process be 
country owned and sustainable, even if so requested by government or civil 
society, external agencies should resist becoming involved except through 
indirect support.  This reform would not rule out PPAs, which are primarily 
information gathering exercises.  
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4. DFID Practice in Asia  
 
 The recommendations for DFID practice derive from the characteristics of 
Asia countries which are discussed in some detail:  lack of aid dependency (Nepal is 
an exception), long-established planning institutions, and strong government 
ownership of development policy (again, Nepal is an exception).  Derivative from 
these characteristics come the following recommendations.  These refer to practice in 
Asia;  and would not typically apply to DFID operations in other regions, especially in 
the sub-Sahara. 
 
1. DFID’s influence on national policy in Asia is more likely to come through 
patient support for institutional change over the long period than via direct 
policy advice at the highest levels of government. 
2. One promising manner to affect national policy is through using technical 
assistance and ‘best practice’ techniques to foster pro-poor monitoring of 
public expenditure.   
3. There are levers for change at the sectoral and provincial/state levels that 
can be successfully used.  Entry points would be: 
a. working with line ministries to impact on sectoral plans, such as 
supporting the formulation of an education policy in Vietnam; 
b. collaboration at the state level in India in the development of PRSs, 
and with provincial administrations in Vietnam;  states and provinces 
should be carefully selected for their demonstrated pro-poor 
commitment, and should lead to long-lasting partnerships. 
 
 The assistance modalities for sectoral and provincial/state would include: 
 
1. capacity building with a direct pro-poor outcome, for design of PRSs, 
improvement in implementation, and poverty impact monitoring; and 
2. information dissemination, to bring international ‘best practice’ to the 
attention of ministries and provincial/state officials. 
 
 Following these general principles should position DFID to engage in a 
long term process for institutional change in ministries and provinces/states, 
including more effective budgeting, improved implementation, and more effective 
monitoring.   Currently, DFID in India and Vietnam is engaged at the 
provincial/state level, and does work with line ministries, so the recommendations 
represent a shift in emphasis rather than a change in basic approach.  However, in 
light of our findings, the question arises whether some of DFID’s current work 
reflects its comparative advantage.  For example, work related to integrating 
current and capital accounts of national budgets, as important as it may be, might 
be left to the World Bank and the IMF.   
 
 Similarly, support for the development of MTEFs at national level may 
yield a lower return in terms on development assistance than sectoral and 
provincial/state modalities of assistance.  This management mechanism would be 
expected to yield greater value added in Africa, where in many countries policy 
making institutions are weaker than in Asia.  On paper, the MTEF of Nepal is an 
impressive mechanism, but in practice we judge its impact on the implementation 
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of pro-poor policies to be virtually nil.  As noted elsewhere, Vietnam may be open 
to developing a MTEF, but unlikely  to do so at the urging of donors & lenders.  In 
India a MTEF at the national level is not a possibility in the foreseeable future.  If 
DFID work on fiscal policy at the national level continues, it is probably unrealistic 
to pursue the fostering integration of current and capital budgets, and enhancing 
this with MTEFs.  In Asia, in countries where national MTEFs are unrealistic at 
present, a second best approach may be to work on regional and state levels 
regarding public expenditure management issues including MTEFs, and to focus 
on the more limited goal of pro-poor monitoring of public expenditure (see above), 
especially in sectoral programmes. 
 
 The government of Nepal has demonstrated extremely limited commitment 
to poverty reduction, as evidenced by a general failure of project and programme 
implementation and its unwillingness to find a solution to the on-going civil war.  
In light of the government record on implementation, there would seem no clear 
reason for DFID to support the PRS process.  Serious consideration should be 
given to scaling down DFID involvement in Nepal.  Justifiable interventions would 
be limited to ones that have a clear and direct impact on poverty reduction. 
 
 
 In light of the difficulties of successful engagement in Nepal, DFID should 
consider a review of its policy on the pre-conditions for initiating and continuing a 
country programme.  While such reviews are part of the three-year country 
programme documents, a consideration of general guidelines, based on what some 
donors & lenders call ‘shared values’ would be appropriate. 
 
 Perhaps the most important lesson emerging from these three case studies is 
an obvious one:  a single set of programmes cannot be successfully implemented 
by DFID in all Asian countries.  We have given a number of examples to support 
this conclusion (e.g., seeking to integrate current and capital budgets in India is 
futile).  One implication is that an undifferentiated policy of DFID ‘aligning’ its 
assistance with the PRSP in each country through general budget support should be 
reviewed.  Similarly and closely related, the practice of joint funding with other 
donors & lenders should be careful scrutinised to ensure that DFID does find its 
unique contribution subsumed under and diluted by the priorities of others. 
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Annex 1: 
Summary of the PRSP Process in Various Countries 
 
 This annex provides a summary of the PRSP process in countries not included 
in the terms of reference of this study.  The purpose is to provide support for the 
conclusions drawn from the study of the three DFID countries, Nepal, India and 
Vietnam.  The study of these three suggests that two country characteristics have a 
strong bearing on generating a positive contribution of the PRSP process to national 
poverty reduction policy:  government ownership and the existence of a poverty 
reduction programme prior to the PRSP process.  Government ownership results in 
commitment to PRSP policies and the political will to implement them, while a prior 
poverty reduction strategy facilitates integrating the PRSP process into national 
priorities.  The countries in Table A2.1 are divided into three categories:  those with 
strong ownership of development policies and a poverty reduction programme in 
place prior to the PRSP process, weak ownership and no prior programme or an 
ineffective one, and a third category for the two countries in which the government 
changed after the PRSP was written.   
 
 The latter category, which includes none of the DFID countries, is quite 
important, since it represents a complication that was not anticipated in the design of 
the PRSP process by the World Bank, or by cooperating donors & lenders. One can 
argue that if the PRSP arises from a process of broad consultation, its legitimacy may 
transcend any particular government.  However, the reality is that few participation 
processes have been sufficiently broad based to qualify as bestowing trans-
government legitimacy on the PRSP.  Even if such were the case, it would be 
unreasonable to hold a new elected government to the policies of its predecessor, on 
the argument that an election in effects over-rides previous participatory processes. 
 
 The judgements in Table A2.1 are summarised in the three parts of Table 
A2.2, and tend to support the conclusions of our study of India, Nepal and Vietnam.  
The first part of Table A2.2 summarises the results for all countries, and the second 
and third parts divide the countries into categories ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ government 
ownership.  The results in these two parts can be judged as significantly different 
when a Chi-square test is applied (with less than .01 probability that they are actually 
from the same sample).  In only one of the sixteen countries was there no 
improvement in poverty analysis as a result of the PRS process (and in twelve the 
improvement is not qualified);  the one country was the exception that proves the rule, 
Angola, which suspended its PRS process as a result of disputes with donors & 
lenders.  It appears that the PRS process can improve a government’s poverty analysis 
whether ownership is strong or weak, with or without a poverty reduction strategy 
before the PRS process, and in the absence of effective policy making institutions.  
This represents a strong argument for transfer of ‘best practice’ information and 
capacity building in analytical skills, both of which are stressed in this report. 
 
 The results for participation are much more mixed, and differ significantly 
between countries with strong and weak ownership of development policy.  In not one 
of the five strong ownership countries was the improvement in participation 
unqualified, compared to three among the weak ownership countries.  We conclude 
that this reflects a resistance on the part of governments with a strong sense of 
ownership to alter or augment their political processes in response to an external 
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initiative.  Weak ownership tends to be associated with aid dependency (though 
Uganda is an obvious exception), and willing to adjust or enhance participation 
mechanism in response to donor& lender demands.  This difference prompts our 
recommendation that in Asia DFID, and donors & lenders in general, should avoid 
involving themselves in participation process, except where involvement is an 
extension of the provision of information and capacity building. 
 
 The absence of a PRS impact on participation in the strong ownership 
countries makes it no surprise that there was little improvement in public awareness of 
poverty issues.  In only three countries did an unqualified improvement occur:  
Kyrgyz Republic, Zambia, and Bolivia, in each case for quite different reasons. 
 
 Quite encouraging for DFID’s work is the judgement that there was an 
‘improvement’ in planning coherence and coordination in three strong ownership 
countries, and ‘small improvement’ in the other two.  Among the eleven other 
countries, in eight there was no effect of the PRS process.  We interpret this as 
indicating that countries with strong ownership and effective national planning 
institutions are more like and better able to adopt, albeit selectively, international ‘best 
practice’, and accurately identify their capacity building needs. 
 
 Judgements about development partnerships are perhaps the most difficult to 
make, but donors & lenders tend to respond positively to the mere completion of a 
PRS document.  But if our judgements are correct, that in countries with strong 
ownership development partnerships more frequently improved, it follows that strong 
ownership enhances development cooperation, which is a central premise of the PRS 
process. 
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Table A2.1: Summary of Major Aspects of the PRS Process in Sixteen Countries 
Country  Country characteristics PRSP assessment 
I. Strong  government ownership and NPrRS before PRSP (5) 
1. Ethiopia 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: CG yes 
3. Conflict: Yes 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        improvement 
5. Partnerships:            improvement 
2. India 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: Yes 
3. Conflict: Yes 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:       small improvement 
5. Partnerships:           no effect 
3. Kyrgyz Republic 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: Yes 
3. Conflict: No  
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        improvement 
5. Partnerships:            improvement 
4. Uganda 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: Yes  
[AIDS affected] 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        improvement 
5. Partnerships:            improvement 
5. Vietnam 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: CG yes 
3. Conflict: No 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        small improvement 
5. Partnerships:            improvement 
II. Weak  government ownership (9)  
1. Angola 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: Yes  
[PRSP process suspended 
before completion] 
1. Poverty analysis:     no effect 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no effect 
2. Azerbaijan 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: CG yes 
3. Conflict: No 
 
1. Poverty analysis:     small improvement 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            small improvement 
3. Lesotho 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: No 
Severely AIDS affected 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    no effect 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no effect 
4. Mali 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: CG yes 
3. Conflict: No 
[.NPrRS>PRSP] 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           improvement 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no conclusion 
5. Mongolia 1. Eff NPnS: Yes, weak 
2. AHC: Yes 
3. Conflict: No 
[NPrRS>PRSP,but weak] 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no effect 
6. Nepal 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: No 
[NPrRS>PRSP] 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no conclusion 
5. Partnerships:            improvement  
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7. Pakistan 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: Yes 
3. Conflict: Yes 
[NPrRS>PRSP] 
1. Poverty analysis:     small improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        small improvement 
5. Partnerships:            no conclusion 
8. Tanzania 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: No 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           small improvement 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        small improvement 
5. Partnerships:            improvement 
9. Zambia 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: No 
3. Conflict: No 
[NPrRS>PRSP  
1. Poverty analysis:     small improvement 
2. Participation:           improvement 
3. Public awareness:    improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no conclusion 
5. Partnerships:            no conclusion 
III. Other: Change in government  after PRSP completed (2) 
1. Bolivia 1. Eff NPnS: No 
2. AHC: CG Yes 
3. Confl-afftd: Yes*  
[NPrRS began under HIPC] 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           improvement 
3. Public awareness:    improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no effect 
2. Kenya 1. Eff NPnS: Yes 
2. AHC: CG Yes 
3. Confl-afftd: No 
AIDS affected 
1. Poverty analysis:     improvement 
2. Participation:           no effect 
3. Public awareness:    small improvement 
4. Planning C&C:        no effect 
5. Partnerships:            no effect 
Notes: 
The countries in bold were covered in the current study.  Vietnam was also covered in the UNDP 
study (see UNDP 2003).  This table can be compared to Annex 5 of the World Bank’s 2003 report on 
progress made by countries in formulating Comprehensive Development Frameworks, which makes 
assessments over similar issues and processes (World Bank 2003, pp. 43ff) 
‘no conclusion’ means that either the changes were contradictory, or the process was too recent to 
venture a judgement. 
*Severely repressive dictatorship in 1970s & early 1980s, & long history of ethnic-based conflict. 
Legend: 
AIDS – the disease 
AHC – adequate human capacity for policy implementation at national level 
Confl-afftd – conflict affected 
Eff NPnS – effective national planning strategy 
NPrRS>PRSP – national poverty reduction strategy before PRSP 
Partnerships – relations between national governments and donors & lenders 
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
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Table A2.2a:  Summary of Judgements on the PRS Process,  
Strong Ownership 
[number of countries] 
Elements of the 
process/impact 
 
improvement
small 
improvement
no effect/ 
no conclusion
Poverty Analysis 5 0 0 
Participation 0 3 2 
Public awareness 1 0 4 
Planning coordination 
& coherence 
 
3 
 
2 
 
0 
Partnerships 4 0 1 
Total (percentage) 13 (52%) 5 (20%) 7 (28%) 
 
 
Table A2.2b:  Summary of Judgements on the PRS Process,  
Weak Ownership 
[number of countries] 
Elements of the 
process/impact 
 
improvement
small 
improvement
no effect/ 
no conclusion
Poverty Analysis 7 3 1 
Participation 3 4 4 
Public awareness 2 6 3 
Planning coordination 
& coherence 
 
1 
 
2 
 
8 
Partnerships 1 2 8 
Total (percentage*) 14 (25%) 17 (31%) 24 (44%) 
*Rounded to nearest integer. 
 
Table A2.2c:  Summary of Judgements on the PRS Process,  
All 16 Countries 
[number of countries] 
Elements of the 
process/impact 
 
improvement
small 
improvement
no effect/ 
no conclusion
Poverty Analysis 12 3 1 
Participation 3 7 6 
Public awareness 3 6 7 
Planning coordination 
& coherence 
 
4 
 
4 
 
8 
Partnerships 5 2 9 
Total (percentage)* 27 (34%) 22 (28%) 31 (39%) 
*Rounded to nearest integer. 
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Annex 2: 
TERMS OF REFERENCE  
FOR CONSULTANCY ASSISTANCE 
A comparison of PRSPs and  
National Development Strategies in Asia 
(administrative details omitted) 
 
1.  Basic Information 
1.1.1 The consultants are to supply the services below to DFID. 
2. Background 
2.1.1 Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs), produced by developing 
countries themselves, are generally seen by donors as an appropriate mechanism for 
demonstrating commitment to poverty reduction and providing a means of 
coordinating donor commitments to poverty reduction.  The development of such 
poverty strategies has often been linked to the use of  "New Aid Instruments" (NAIs) 
such as Budget Support and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) and a move away from 
using projects as the main means of delivering developing assistance. 
2.1.2 In a number of countries, particularly in Africa, a key factor driving donors and 
governments together to introduce PRSPs and NAIs has been high aid dependency and 
indebtedness, particularly the implementation of the HIPC initiative.   A number of 
Asian countries, however, do not have PRSPs.  In Asia, aid dependency is generally 
low, and there are, perhaps, fewer problems with implementing projects.   There are 
also long-established planning processes producing National Development Strategies 
(NDS).   
2.1.3 Policies for poverty reduction have been set within in a context of central 
planning and federal state structures.  Limited donor influence and limited dependence 
on debt relief has meant that often Asian countries have not come under strong donor 
pressure to introduce PRS-type planning.   In India the World Bank has agreed that the 
government's Plan document can be seen as approximating to a PRSP. 
2.1.4 In addition, several Asian countries are large and have both national (federal) 
and sub-national (state/provincial/district) systems of government.  Often the 
population covered by sub-national governments exceeds that of many countries.  In 
practice, sub-national governments tend to have responsibility for most social sector 
programmes, although typically there are major vertical health programmes managed 
by federal government; and there can be dedicated grants for other specific purposes 
including in the education sector.   
2.1.5 NDSs also tend to be led by the federal government incorporating federal 
programmes and concerns.  The extent of interest in national strategies on the part of 
sub-national systems of government varies, as does the extent to which the national 
government consults sub-national ones.  A number of sub-national governments have 
strategy documents which may meet some of the characteristics of PRSs.  In few 
countries are PRS processes yet proving an effective way of coordinating donors 
around poverty policies.  There are also few examples of SWAps in Asia. 
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2.1.6 The willingness or ability of central government to involve sub-national 
governments in drawing up NDSs and PRSPs is an important issue in large Asian 
countries.   There can often be a tension between the responsibilities placed on sub-
national governments in delivering national policies and the resources available to 
them.   A high degree of fiscal inequality within, as well as between, different sub-
national governments will affect their ability to meet these obligations.  
2.1.7 DFID's Asia Regional Policy Department (ASREP) wishes to explore further 
the implications of the introduction of PRSP processes in Asia, given Asian countries 
long and deep experience of planning processes.    DFID proposes to undertake a study 
of the policy-making process in three Asian countries, Vietnam, Indonesia and India.  
The first two or these are countries which are producing a PRSP.  India is also included 
as a case study country in order to provide comparisons with a country that will not be 
producing a PRSP. 
3. Objectives 
3.1.1 The objective of the consultancy is to inform DFID of the complementarities 
and contradictions between PRSP processes and existing NDS ones in Asia.  It would 
assess whether the introduction of PRSPs is enhancing poverty reduction processes and 
whether these changes are positive or negative.  It would also evaluate whether over 
the medium term the process of preparing, implementing, resourcing, and monitoring a 
PRSP is likely to lead to stronger, more pro-poor, more accountable national planning 
processes.  The work would inform DFID staff on appropriate approaches for working 
with governments on developing their PRSPs. 
3.1.2 The consultancy will complement other studies being produced for DFID on:  
• policy-making processes in Asia - the dynamics of how to achieve higher 
priority in the political agenda for pro-poor interventions in public policy. 
• PRSPs and politics, covering selected PRSP cases in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. 
• The use of different aid instruments in Asia. 
• An Evaluation of Budget Support  
 
3.1.3 The first two studies mentioned above will provide information on the political 
economy of policy making and implementation in Asia.  Whilst this study will also 
cover the political forces behind the writing and dissemination of NDSs and PRSPs to 
some extent, its focus is less on the motives for involvement and more on the quality of 
the processes by which each is produced and the extent to which a process (the PRSP 
process) designed outside Asia can be adapted to the existing ones found on the 
continent. 
3.1.4 The information provided by the study will help DFID Asia country 
programmes in their activity and strategy planning and in their discussions with 
governments on appropriate ways for delivering effective development assistance.    It 
will also assist ASREP in internal DFID discussions on how to help countries improve 
their national planning processes.   Finally it will help DFID to put together its 
strategies for meeting its poverty reduction target contained in its Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) with the Treasury.   
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4.  Scope of Work 
4.1.1 The proposed methodology would split the study into two parts.  The first 
would provide the institutional and historical context for the introduction of the PRSP 
into a country.  The second would then look at how the PRSP process is affected by the 
historical background and how it interacts with the institutional processes already 
established in the case country.  These are elaborated upon below.  
4.1.2 The first part of the study would provide an historical overview of existing local 
development/poverty reduction strategies.  This would look at how existing NDSs 
were developed, who the stakeholders were and what their remit was (eg targeted 
interventions, safety nets, structural and macroeconomic reform, etc), how effective 
they were both in diagnosing and addressing poverty, and what the constraints faced 
were.   There would also be an examination of how existing strategies have been tied 
into national and sub-national political and administrative processes, the different 
conflicts of interest and processes of conflict resolution surrounding the poverty 
reduction process and budget allocation,  what the role of local level organisations has 
been (in both strategy formulation and execution) and role of government planning vis-
à-vis the private sector.  
4.1.3  The study will then address the added value of a PRSP in the two country case 
studies which are producing one, looking at the same areas as covered above, with a 
view to drawing out comparisons between the two processes on, for example: 
• how each defines and addresses poverty reduction; 
• the breadth of the analysis of poverty;  
• the breadth and depth of the consultation process; 
• the process by which poverty is diagnosed and the extent to which this 
diagnosis is agreed between domestic stakeholders, both inside government (at 
different levels of government (federal and provincial/state), sectors or sub-
sectors) and outside government;  
• How the concept of poverty reduction is communicated within government and 
to the public; 
• The extent to which poverty reduction is mainstreamed within government 
systems and processes. 
Finally, from the work undertaken above it should also be possible to draw out some 
perceptions and influences of PRSPs, giving an insight into, amongst others: 
 
• Why some governments have embraced PRSPs more than others 
 
• The understanding of in-country stakeholders of what PRSPs are and how they 
differ from other processes; 
• How these stakeholders see PRSPs fitting in with existing National 
Development Strategies (NDSs).   (Are they additional or could they be 
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incorporated into them?)  For India, the issue would be the extent to which they 
see existing NDS process adopting features of PRSP processes; 
• the perceptions of different stakeholders on the role budget support and SWAps 
are to play in PRSPs (or in India's case, its plans); 
 
• Whether the PRSP process has changed the way that central agencies interact 
with line ministries in the planning process; 
 
• Whether the PRSP process has changed the way that national agencies interacts 
with sub-national agencies in the planning process; 
 
• Whether the PRSP process has changed the way that resource allocation takes 
place; 
 
• Whether the PRSP process has changed the government's relationship with 
civil society. 
 
4.1.4 In India the consultants would look at how India's the poverty reduction is 
articulated in its NDSs in the absence of a PRSP.  They would also report on the extent 
to which processes emphasised in PRSP literature are being introduced into India.  
They would then compare findings to those in the other two case studies.  
4.1.5 The consultants will use a range of approaches to investigate these issues in 
order to ensure triangulation.   Work would take place in their home country and in the 
case country.  The consultants would initially undertake a desk study, covering general 
materials on PRSPs and background material for the three case study countries.  This 
would cover academic literature, donor and recipient papers and website searches.   
4.1.6 The consultants will then undertake in-depth work in the case countries. The 
consultants will hold key informant interviews with government officials, civil society 
representatives and other stakeholders as applicable.  Strategy and policy documents, 
academic literature, monitoring and evaluation material, as well as secondary material, 
such as any records of relevant past consultations with stakeholders will support the 
key findings.  Issues of bias and objectivity should be explored and explicitly 
recognised within the paper.  Different stakeholders are likely to express diverging 
views about the incentives for adopting PRSP processes.   
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